Friday 30th January 2009 (14:30-16:30 pm)
Reinaldo Bernal V. (PhD with Max Kistler)
Abstract: The main question I will address is what are the ontological commitments the acceptance of a scientific theory entails. Firstly, I will sketch the different types of answers that have been given -realist, antirealist and “partially realists” ones- and classify the main points of disagreement under the usual categories: metaphysical, semantic and epistemic. Secondly, I will present a minimal formulation of epistemic externalism, suited for an alternative view (on progress) on the relation between scientific models and real systems. Thirdly, I shall present this view -which I label “scientific externalism”- and discuss some of its consequences for the realism/antirealism debate. I will favour a causal theory of reference and, accordingly, detach the question of reference from the question of truth. I will claim that the referents of "scientific entities" -the ones proposed by scientific models and individuated by this description- are fixed by the (very complex) causal chains relating models and real entities. The reference relation thus holds despite the fact that the theory can turn out to be completely inadequate. Finally, I will propose an answer to the main question on the grounds of this externalist theory. I will take for granted that rational acceptance depends on belief, and propose that degrees of belief in theories should be guided by the interplay of two opposite forces: against belief we have "the length" of a magnitude I call “inductive distance”, and in support of belief we mainly have, as usual, empirical confirmation.
Aucun commentaire:
Enregistrer un commentaire