"Paths to Singularity: Cognitive Space and the Construction of Singular Thought"

Friday 13th March (2:30-4:30 pm)

Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho (PhD Student with François Recanati)

Abstract: I will examine the following question: what makes a thought singular? Can we give criteria for singularity in such a way that, on the one hand, is not question-begging, that is, does not presuppose one or another theory used to explain it, and, on the other, can also be restrictive enough to exclude cases of non-singularity? I will identify two sets of theories which can be used to explain it, acquaintance models (Evans 1982) and mental file theories (Recanati 1993, 2008, Jeshion 2002), and go over some of the merits and disadvantages of both. After seeing some of their motivations and explanatory desiderata, I will precise and highlight some notions such as the normativity that guides these thoughts, and the notion of thought being 'connected' to just one object, which these theories aim to capture. I will then propose a new framework for explaining singular thought – one that combines some elements of both sets of theories, which, I'll claim, can give a promising account of what makes a thought singular while at the same time keeping normativity and avoiding some difficulties of the other accounts I'll point out during the talk.

Descriptive Names as Descriptions of Names

Friday 27th February 2009 (14:30-16:30 pm)

Gregory Bochner (PhD with François Recanati and P. Kreutz)

Abstract. So-called descriptive names are names whose reference is known only by description. For instance, « Jack the Ripper » is a name for whoever committed certain crimes in London. I argue that the characteristic feature of descriptive names is that in their case it is not only the reference of the name but also the very name itself which is known only by description. This is so because both its form and its bearer are essential ingredients of what metaphysically individuates any given name, so that not knowing exactly which entity is the actual referent of a name (i.e. knowing the referent only by description) entails not knowing exactly which name is the actual name (i.e. knowing the name only by description). I then argue that most names are descriptive in this metasemantic sense (relative to particular speakers at particular times) and that this is what explains the cognitive significance of names in general.