TBA

Friday 26th (2:30-4:30 pm)

Marie-Christine Nizzi (PhD Student with Max Kistler)

Semantic Relativism and Two Notions of Subjective Perspective

Friday 12th (5:30-7:30 pm)

Marie Guillot (PhD with François Récanati)

Le nom de "Dieu" est-il propre?

Friday 5th (2:30-4:30)

Yann Schmitt (PhD Student with Frédéric Nef)

Abstract: Si "Dieu" est un nom propre et si l'on accepte une théorie de la référence directe, il semble que la phrase, si longtemps débattue, (P) "Dieu existe" ressemble à une tautologie. Si "Dieu" réfère directement à une entité alors il est trivial de dire que Dieu existe. La question des noms propres éventuellement vides se pose donc pour quiconque doit analyser (P). Je me propose de voir comment les théories descriptivistes et de la référence directe peuvent permettre de donner une lecture acceptable de (P) dans le cadre d'une discussion sur sa valeur de vérité.

TBA

Friday 24th April (2:30-4:30 pm)

Margherita Arcangeli (PhD Student with Jérôme Dokic)

"Paths to Singularity: Cognitive Space and the Construction of Singular Thought"

Friday 13th March (2:30-4:30 pm)

Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho (PhD Student with François Recanati)

Abstract: I will examine the following question: what makes a thought singular? Can we give criteria for singularity in such a way that, on the one hand, is not question-begging, that is, does not presuppose one or another theory used to explain it, and, on the other, can also be restrictive enough to exclude cases of non-singularity? I will identify two sets of theories which can be used to explain it, acquaintance models (Evans 1982) and mental file theories (Recanati 1993, 2008, Jeshion 2002), and go over some of the merits and disadvantages of both. After seeing some of their motivations and explanatory desiderata, I will precise and highlight some notions such as the normativity that guides these thoughts, and the notion of thought being 'connected' to just one object, which these theories aim to capture. I will then propose a new framework for explaining singular thought – one that combines some elements of both sets of theories, which, I'll claim, can give a promising account of what makes a thought singular while at the same time keeping normativity and avoiding some difficulties of the other accounts I'll point out during the talk.

Descriptive Names as Descriptions of Names

Friday 27th February 2009 (14:30-16:30 pm)

Gregory Bochner (PhD with François Recanati and P. Kreutz)

Abstract. So-called descriptive names are names whose reference is known only by description. For instance, « Jack the Ripper » is a name for whoever committed certain crimes in London. I argue that the characteristic feature of descriptive names is that in their case it is not only the reference of the name but also the very name itself which is known only by description. This is so because both its form and its bearer are essential ingredients of what metaphysically individuates any given name, so that not knowing exactly which entity is the actual referent of a name (i.e. knowing the referent only by description) entails not knowing exactly which name is the actual name (i.e. knowing the name only by description). I then argue that most names are descriptive in this metasemantic sense (relative to particular speakers at particular times) and that this is what explains the cognitive significance of names in general.

Is there such a thing as a constitutive rule?

Friday 20th February 2009 (10:00-12h00 am)

Olivier Morin (PhD with Dan Sperber)

Abstract: In the philosophy of social sciences, one frequently encounters the claim that every institution is founded upon at least one constitutive rule. Constitutive rules, as opposed to rules that merely regulate already existing behaviours, are supposed to make possible social practices that would not exist independently of the rules thaey are constituted by. Thus, it is said, one cannot, on pain of contradiction, lend money to one's self, because one constitutive rule of the institution of lending is that there must be a borrower distinct from the lender. Two claims will be defended. First, in order to be constitutive in an interesting way, a rule must be part of a complete definition of the institution it constitutes. Otherwise, an instance of the institution could exist without instantiating the rule. Second, institutions are very hard to define in a complete way. To say that a rule is constitutive is merely to make a risky bet on the future of that institution and the stability of public consensus.