DOC'IN NICOD 2008-2009

TBA

2009-06-05T02:46:00.000-07:00

Friday 26th (2:30-4:30 pm)

Marie-Christine Nizzi (PhD Student with Max Kistler)

Semantic Relativism and Two Notions of Subjective Perspective

2009-06-05T02:42:00.000-07:00

Friday 12th (5:30-7:30 pm)

Marie Guillot (PhD with François Récanati)

Le nom de "Dieu" est-il propre?

2009-06-05T02:39:00.000-07:00

Friday 5th (2:30-4:30)

Yann Schmitt (PhD Student with Frédéric Nef)

Abstract: Si "Dieu" est un nom propre et si l'on accepte une théorie de la référence directe, il semble que la phrase, si longtemps débattue, (P) "Dieu existe" ressemble à une tautologie. Si "Dieu" réfère directement à une entité alors il est trivial de dire que Dieu existe. La question des noms propres éventuellement vides se pose donc pour quiconque doit analyser (P). Je me propose de voir comment les théories descriptivistes et de la référence directe peuvent permettre de donner une lecture acceptable de (P) dans le cadre d'une discussion sur sa valeur de vérité.

TBA

2009-04-06T09:27:00.000-07:00

Friday 24th April (2:30-4:30 pm)

Margherita Arcangeli (PhD Student with Jérôme Dokic)

"Paths to Singularity: Cognitive Space and the Construction of Singular Thought"

2009-02-23T06:28:00.000-08:00

Friday 13th March (2:30-4:30 pm)

Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho (PhD Student with François Recanati)

Abstract: I will examine the following question: what makes a thought singular? Can we give criteria for singularity in such a way that, on the one hand, is not question-begging, that is, does not presuppose one or another theory used to explain it, and, on the other, can also be restrictive enough to exclude cases of non-singularity? I will identify two sets of theories which can be used to explain it, acquaintance models (Evans 1982) and mental file theories (Recanati 1993, 2008, Jeshion 2002), and go over some of the merits and disadvantages of both. After seeing some of their motivations and explanatory desiderata, I will precise and highlight some notions such as the normativity that guides these thoughts, and the notion of thought being 'connected' to just one object, which these theories aim to capture. I will then propose a new framework for explaining singular thought – one that combines some elements of both sets of theories, which, I'll claim, can give a promising account of what makes a thought singular while at the same time keeping normativity and avoiding some difficulties of the other accounts I'll point out during the talk.

Descriptive Names as Descriptions of Names

2009-02-16T08:14:00.000-08:00

Friday 27th February 2009 (14:30-16:30 pm)

Gregory Bochner (PhD with François Recanati and P. Kreutz)

Abstract. So-called descriptive names are names whose reference is known only by description. For instance, « Jack the Ripper » is a name for whoever committed certain crimes in London. I argue that the characteristic feature of descriptive names is that in their case it is not only the reference of the name but also the very name itself which is known only by description. This is so because both its form and its bearer are essential ingredients of what metaphysically individuates any given name, so that not knowing exactly which entity is the actual referent of a name (i.e. knowing the referent only by description) entails not knowing exactly which name is the actual name (i.e. knowing the name only by description). I then argue that most names are descriptive in this metasemantic sense (relative to particular speakers at particular times) and that this is what explains the cognitive significance of names in general.

Is there such a thing as a constitutive rule?

2008-12-19T06:40:00.000-08:00

Friday 20th February 2009 (10:00-12h00 am)

Olivier Morin (PhD with Dan Sperber)

Abstract: In the philosophy of social sciences, one frequently encounters the claim that every institution is founded upon at least one constitutive rule. Constitutive rules, as opposed to rules that merely regulate already existing behaviours, are supposed to make possible social practices that would not exist independently of the rules thaey are constituted by. Thus, it is said, one cannot, on pain of contradiction, lend money to one's self, because one constitutive rule of the institution of lending is that there must be a borrower distinct from the lender. Two claims will be defended. First, in order to be constitutive in an interesting way, a rule must be part of a complete definition of the institution it constitutes. Otherwise, an instance of the institution could exist without instantiating the rule. Second, institutions are very hard to define in a complete way. To say that a rule is constitutive is merely to make a risky bet on the future of that institution and the stability of public consensus.

Immunité aux erreurs d'identification et relation de "concerning" (réponse à Roblin Meeks)

2008-12-19T06:36:00.000-08:00

Friday 13th February 2009 (14:30-16:30 pm)

Jérémie Lafraire (PhD with François Recanati)

Epistemic Externalism and the Ontology of Science

2008-12-19T06:23:00.000-08:00

Friday 30th January 2009 (14:30-16:30 pm)

Reinaldo Bernal V. (PhD with Max Kistler)

Abstract: The main question I will address is what are the ontological commitments the acceptance of a scientific theory entails. Firstly, I will sketch the different types of answers that have been given -realist, antirealist and “partially realists” ones- and classify the main points of disagreement under the usual categories: metaphysical, semantic and epistemic. Secondly, I will present a minimal formulation of epistemic externalism, suited for an alternative view (on progress) on the relation between scientific models and real systems. Thirdly, I shall present this view -which I label “scientific externalism”- and discuss some of its consequences for the realism/antirealism debate. I will favour a causal theory of reference and, accordingly, detach the question of reference from the question of truth. I will claim that the referents of "scientific entities" -the ones proposed by scientific models and individuated by this description- are fixed by the (very complex) causal chains relating models and real entities. The reference relation thus holds despite the fact that the theory can turn out to be completely inadequate. Finally, I will propose an answer to the main question on the grounds of this externalist theory. I will take for granted that rational acceptance depends on belief, and propose that degrees of belief in theories should be guided by the interplay of two opposite forces: against belief we have "the length" of a magnitude I call “inductive distance”, and in support of belief we mainly have, as usual, empirical confirmation.

Psychologie et normativité épistémique : comment la métacognition peut-elle nous aider à comprendre le lien existant entre cognition et connaissance ?

2008-12-19T06:21:00.000-08:00

Monday 16th January 2009 (14:30-16:30 pm)

Fabian Bernache Maldonado (PhD with Jérôme Dokic)

Abstract: According to traditional epistemologists, there is an essential difference between belief formation and knowledge acquisition. Although belief formation is necessary to knowledge acquisition, traditional epistemologists argue that believing that p is not enough for knowing that p. According to them, knowledge acquisition also requires the implementation of an evaluative process by means of which we are supposed to assess the epistemic acceptability of our beliefs. This crucial difference between belief formation and knowledge acquisition seems to entail that epistemology is irreducible to psychology and make knowledge inexplicable from a purely cognitive point of view. In fact, according to traditional epistemologists, given that knowledge acquisition is essentially a normative phenomenon, it cannot be reduced to the bare execution of cognitive processes. However, are we entitled to exclude normativity from cognitive performance? In this talk, we shall examine the relevance of the notion of normativity in the understanding of metacognitive processes, that is, in the understanding of reflective thinking processes leading to a control of cognitive processes. We shall inquire to what extent this kind of (metacognitive) normativity is compatible with the normativity of epistemology proper. We shall try to show that the control of our cognitive processes by means of metacognitive capacities is a fundamental form of epistemic evaluation of beliefs.

Résumé: Pour l’épistémologue traditionnel, il existe une différence essentielle entre la formation de nos croyances et l’acquisition des connaissances. Bien que la formation des croyances soit absolument indispensable à l’acquisition des connaissances, l’épistémologue traditionnel soutient qu’il ne suffit pas de croire que p pour savoir que p. D’après lui, outre la formation des croyances, l’acquisition des connaissances exige la mise en place d’un processus évaluatif à travers lequel nous sommes censés déterminer l’acceptabilité épistémique de nos croyances. Cette différence cruciale entre formation des croyances et acquisition des connaissances semble cependant entraîner l’irréductibilité de l’épistémologie à la psychologie et faire de la connaissance un phénomène inexplicable d’un point de vue purement cognitif. En effet, pour l’épistémologue traditionnel, l’acquisition des connaissances, en tant que phénomène essentiellement normatif, ne peut se réduire à la simple réalisation de certains processus cognitifs. Mais, aurions-nous raison d’exclure la normativité de notre activité cognitive ? Dans cette présentation, nous considérerons l’importance de la notion de normativité dans la compréhension des phénomènes métacognitifs, c’est-à-dire, dans la compréhension de l’activité réflexive de la pensée aboutissant à une régulation de nos processus cognitifs. Nous nous demanderons dans quelle mesure ce type (métacognitif) de normativité est compatible avec le type de normativité essentiel à l’épistémologie. Ainsi essayerons-nous de montrer que la régulation de nos processus cognitifs, à travers l’exercice de nos capacités métacognitives, est une forme fondamentale d’évaluation épistémique de nos croyances.

Body Representation: Structure and Integration

2008-12-10T07:02:00.000-08:00

Friday 19th December 2008 (10-12 am)

Adrian Smith (Mainz University, visiting PhD Student at IJN)

Abstract: Moving the body often requires the coordination of parts of the body as parts of an integrated whole. Conscious experience of the body presents focally attended parts of the body as parts of an integrated whole. In this paper I explore the structure and extent of the internal representation involved in enabling these respective phenomena. In both cases I note the potential for two kinds of account, one that involves a central global representation, and one which does not. For each account, in both cases, I suggest the potential contributions made by the integrated structure of the actual body.